President Rhee and 8th Army Commander General Walker in Korean War
Board Member, Council on Korean U.S. Security Studies
Professor, Il Hwa Jung, Ph.D
(Baeksuk University)
Friendship in War Crisis
The first meeting between President Syngman Rhee and General Walton Walker during the Korean War was held dated back on July 14, 1950 at the Taegu Interim Presidential Residence which were property of Kyungbuk Provincial Governor’s residence. The time was very depressed and confused for the consecutive defeat and withdrawal of US ground forces as well as Korean Army.
General Walker had flown over to Korea and observed Korean war front one week ago before visiting Rhee. On July 7, two days after the gloomy defeat of the Smith Task Force of 24th Division at the Osan(Jukmiryung Hill) first battle, he decided to look with bare eyes how the Second World War victor U.S. forces could be crushed in a blow by the pheasant like forces of North Korea.
He landed at Taejon air strip in his personal aircraft to meet Gen. William Dean. The next day, July 8, the two general drove to the front line hill of Chonan about 50km south from the first Osan battle ground. General Dean, 24th Division Commander dispatched his first battalion of 21st regiment to the Osan frontline with deep and rapid deployment tactics on July 5th but to fail stopping the T34-led North Korean invaders, and consecutively threw in 21th Regiment followed by 34th Regiment and lastly 19th Regiment. However, 24th Division could not successfully encountering the Enemy forces yet. It seemed really frustrating as well as challenging new war for the two World War II hero commanders.
General Dean, graduate of Buckley University, fought in the south front of the Germany successfully leading 44th Division and decorated with many military merit medals. He was reputed as high qualitied general even expected to promote to Army Chief of Staffs in the future. 8th Army Commander Lt. General Walton Walker was well known as crack field commander who gained fame by thunderbolt adventure to penetrate southern defence line of Germany to capture Lintz of Austria with ghost like speed commanding his 20th Corps under Gen. Patten’s 3rd Army. Unfortunately the two distinguished generals met respective misfortune after doing their duty brilliantly in the Korean War.
General Dean had done his last duty to delay the North invaders at Taejon until July 20 as General Walker requested, that was very critical for earning time in the war. However, he met misfortune of becoming war captive just after Taejon battle. General Walker was killed in traffic accident after the humiliating defeat of Chongchun river defeat by Chinese Army.
In the first stage of the war they never seemed marooned in any frustration psychology that was very important to keep hope for the Korean people as well as US soldiers. They kept conviction that in the result US Army could win the war, though they were anxious to seek new tactics against the invading forces different from the relentless and continuous attacks that the two generals executed in the Second World War as trade mark.
After surveying Chonan frontline, the General Walker’s jeep met one U.S. tank platoon leader from 19th infantry moving forward to support 34th Infantry troops. In this point General Walker already seemed to devise a new tactics to defend and succeed the Korean War. Walker asked the young lieutenant what he was planning to do in the upcoming action. The lieutenant replied that he was going to ‘slug it out’ with the enemy. The General replied a different idea different from his trade mark of relentless and speedy attack tactics to the lieutenant. “Now, our idea is to stop those people. We don’t go up there and charge or slug it out. We take positions where we have the advantage, where we can fire the first shots and still manage a delaying action.”
General Walker presumably calculated a new war plan in which Naktong River defence perimeter should be designed as of the last withdrawal line to reverse the flow of the war, according to General Dean’s recollection. The strength of the North Korean invading forces was so strong and the vertical line from Seoul to Pusan was not so long to allow any wrong offensive strategy. The most important object was not to win the war in a remarkable speed but how to slow down the attacking torrents until UN forces could procure security bridge to fight back the North Korean.
Later, he named the ‘Taegu-Pusan’ perimeter defence operation as ‘Stand or Die’ that connoted no more withdrawal allowed for the defence forces.
Walker Moved 8th Army Hqs to Taegu
General Walker on the same day of July 8 commanded Gen. William Coullier, chief of staff, to prepare establishment 8 army forward headquarters Korea on Taegu, and he himself arrived at the headquarters with a bulk of his staffs on July 13. The headquarters were very strictly guarded with an order that only colonel or general could pass the gate, so even U.S. Ambassador John Muccio had some troubles to meet the general. Mr. Muccio ordered a U.S. flag from Tokyo for his sedan and set it at the front of the car. Whenever he passed the 8th Army headquarters, he boasted of raising 48 stars in his sedan.
Meanwhile, President Rhee stayed at the Kyungbuk governor’s residence in a depressed and frustrating days with whole bad news of the war. He was especially annoyed to hear the news that American solders also were not compatible with the North Korean tank forces in the war front and the front line was coming down toward Taejon rapidly.
President Rhee got the first report of the invasion at the Kyungbok Palace pond on Sunday, June 25 around 10 O’clock where he was throwing fishing angle as old man leisure or a kind of meditation. He was a little shocked with the invasion report for his worrying prophesy turned into reality. Before the War(1948~1950) he repeatedly requested U.S. Government to the effect that if American forces withdrew from the peninsula with the establishment of Republic of Korea, U.S. should have concluded a mutual defence treaty or provide heavy weapons including tanks and anti-tank weapons. If not U.S. forces withdrawal should produce power vacuum in the peninsula that could induce Communists invasion. The North Korean invasion forces advanced with one of the most formidable weapon T34 in the front and trampled down ROK fortresses. The distance from Kaesung near 38th parallel to Seoul was about 60km, and the speed of T34 was 40km/hour, so if they mobilized a blitz krieg such as of Guderian tactics in the Word War 2, Seoul could be overpowered in a day, and probably even President Rhee could not free from the seizing danger.
Without knowing the level of North Korean military danger Seoul cabinet, National Assembly, even Muccio’s U.S. Embassy announced with resolutions or announcements that they would stay and keep Seoul to the last moments. President Rhee boarded south bound special train on 27th early in the morning, when PA(People’s Army) was thrusting his advance tank unit at the Chooksuk Hill of the suburban Seoul. When Rhee recognized his train arrived at Taegu, he strongly commanded going back at least Taejon to manage the war crisis, so the train rolled back to Taejon where he stayed 3 days at the Chungnam Provincial Governor’s residence.
However, with the worsening of the frontline situation, he was urged by U.S. Embassy as well as U.S. military authorities to go down to Pusan, he was driven by car to Iri, to Mokpo, continued sailing to Chinhae to Pusan. In Pusan he soon commanded to move up to Taejon his office and in the course of trip back to Taejon, but his train was stopped by Mr. Cho Jae Chon, Governor of Kyungbuk Province, saying U.S. Embassy sent words not coming up to Taejon for the military cause. So Rhee began his temporary presidential office on Taegu on July 8.
His long evacuation route and consecutive bad news of the front lines gave the old man very hard time, in that sense the news of 8th Army Headquarters moved to Taegu was like a sunshine light in the dark days.
U.S. Embassy First Secretary Dr. Harold Noble wrote that the meeting between Rhee and Walker was successfully arranged with his arrangement. He requested in his daily meeting to General Walker to go and see President Rhee to give bright hope to the President, according to his book ‘Embassy at War’. Or General Walker might have gone to see and thank for the President decision of transferring Korean Military Forces Command and Control Authorities to UN Commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the day of July 14. Anyway, the first meeting between the two very important persons was a real beginning of the Korea-U.S., Korea-UN close coordination and cooperation during the war and afterwards.
Dr. Noble depicted the first face to face meeting of the two characters in his book: “Walker made a tremendous hit with the president at his very first call. It was not that Walker said anything so striking during this brief conversation. It was his character, his obvious sincerity and determination, the impression he gave of sold professional competence, his conviction that we would win, which Rhee gathered from his short exchange of words with Walker.”
When he returned to see the president after Walker had left, he found the president and Mrs. Rhee were really uplifted. Afterwards whenever he found the president looked gloomy and depressed, he took General Walker to see the president, and it always worked.
In the Taegu-Pusan perimeter(Nakdong River Defence Line) defense battle, General Walker deployed very successful deployment to counter the last ditch offence waves of Kim Il Sung forces. From Daboodong alley Korean divisions were deployed shoulder by shoulder to the East Coast horizontally .
ROKA 1st division was located at Daboodong, and to the right ROKA 6th Division at Mungyung-Yechun, and 8th Division at Andong-Yeusung, followed by Capital Division and 3rd Division deployed to the East coast. Meanwhile, along the western side of the Nakdong River U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, 24th, 25th, and lately U.S. 7th Division and U.S. 1st Marine Division deployed vertically. One of the most brilliant management of the defence strategy was the special operation of so called ‘fire brigade’ of 27th Infantry Regiment commanded by Col. John Michaelis(later 4 star general) that had done splendid victory in very critical battle such as Daboodong, Yongchun, and Chindong battle. In the U.S. military history there had not been such a successful mobile unit operation like Machaelis’ fire brigade.
On seeing the Nakdong perimeter lines stabilized with the ‘Stand or Die’ strategy, General MacArthur pulled out U.S. 7th Division and 1st Marine, plus Korean 17th Regiment and ROK Marine to constitute 10th Corps for the historical Inchun landing. After Seoul recovered with Inchun landing, 8th Army headquarters moved to Seoul at the main building of Seoul National University which is quite near to the presidential palace of Dr. Syngman Rhee.
General Walker had kept his close relations with the president as it was in ‘Taegu-Pusan’ period, such as sending general-use lunch box sent from Tokyo to the presidential palace until he suffered very catastrophic defeat in Chongchun River battle. 8th Army encountered Chinese invasion forces to get crushed in rapid advancement by the Oriental guerilla tactics well known as ‘human wave’ tactics.
General Walker led 8th Army crossing over the th 38th parallel on October 7 so hurriedly and unprepared, he encountered quite big troubles with the Chinese intervention that Mao Zhedung Government repeatedly gave warnings to do toward the West through Indian embassy of Peking or direct announcements. 8th Army advanced to the Yalu River border bedridden with at least 3 strategic weak points. The first was short of supply line. The more speedy and further advancement done toward the Korea-Chinse border, land transportation lines became narrower and deep rugged not enough to move supply trucks available. 8th Army could not get necessary battle supplies in absolute quantities.
In October, the North Korean region changed into winter weather already of which night temperature went down deep below zero with heavy snow. U.S. soldiers were not given even winter outfits and equipments that caused big troubles in the ‘totally new war’ of Chinese intervention. Second weak point of the 8th Army came from the command and control seperation of Almond’s 10th Corps. The 10th Corps of the East side over the Charyung mountains was separated from 8th Army command and control, and directly controlled by UNC Commander General MacArthur in Tokyo. No battlefield information or cooperation could be exchanged between the two UNC armies.
And the third weak aspect was not to get accurate information concerning Chinese Army intervention into Korean War.
However, if there were such weak points General Walker suffered that could not rationalize his military fiasco in October and November. His brilliant military merits of Nakdong River defence and even Normandy landing were to become lackluster.
It is known in this circumstance his behaviour became quite impatient. He could not sit in a place calmly, and often snubbed his driver move from one unit to another unit to observe the battle situation with high speed.
Rhee decorated Walker with Gold Taeguk Military Merit
On December 12, when the rumor of second evacuation of Seoul was imminent, Walker called on President Rhee and asked to see war cabinet members together.
In the Cabinet meeting presided by Rhee, Walker asked to President Rhee and his cabinet members why people of Korea would evacuate Seoul and said to them toughly that 8th Army would not evacuate Seoul as long as ROKA could fight, but if Korean people, especially ROK 2nd Corps would not fight against the enemy, there were no way U.S. forces could continue fighting. Rhee answered to the general’s tough remark that ROK soldiers were fighting and they were ready to die for the country.
President Rhee decorated Walker with Gold Taeguk Military Merit, the highest military merit medal on December 19, just 4 days before Walker was killed in traffic accident. The president cordially requested as usual of using Walker’s personal aircraft to go to ROKA front line, and Walker agreed to use it.
On January 3, 1951, General Walker promoted to 4 star general posthumously and layed at Arlington National Cemetery in prestigious funeral service, attending lots of dignitary and laudatory remarks including Korean Special Envoy Dr. Chang Myun, Korean Ambassador to Washington and 3 other Korean specially dispatched diplomats.
General Walker was succeeded by then vice chief of staff Lt. General Matthew Ridgway by whom President Rhee also was often requested to go with him to give battle field admonishing speech to ROK army.
Writer’s E-mail: icolumn@naver.com
President Rhee and 8th Army Commander General Walker in Korean War
Board Member, Council on Korean U.S. Security Studies
Professor, Il Hwa Jung, Ph.D
(Baeksuk University)
Friendship in War Crisis
The first meeting between President Syngman Rhee and General Walton Walker during the Korean War was held dated back on July 14, 1950 at the Taegu Interim Presidential Residence which were property of Kyungbuk Provincial Governor’s residence. The time was very depressed and confused for the consecutive defeat and withdrawal of US ground forces as well as Korean Army.
General Walker had flown over to Korea and observed Korean war front one week ago before visiting Rhee. On July 7, two days after the gloomy defeat of the Smith Task Force of 24th Division at the Osan(Jukmiryung Hill) first battle, he decided to look with bare eyes how the Second World War victor U.S. forces could be crushed in a blow by the pheasant like forces of North Korea.
He landed at Taejon air strip in his personal aircraft to meet Gen. William Dean. The next day, July 8, the two general drove to the front line hill of Chonan about 50km south from the first Osan battle ground. General Dean, 24th Division Commander dispatched his first battalion of 21st regiment to the Osan frontline with deep and rapid deployment tactics on July 5th but to fail stopping the T34-led North Korean invaders, and consecutively threw in 21th Regiment followed by 34th Regiment and lastly 19th Regiment. However, 24th Division could not successfully encountering the Enemy forces yet. It seemed really frustrating as well as challenging new war for the two World War II hero commanders.
General Dean, graduate of Buckley University, fought in the south front of the Germany successfully leading 44th Division and decorated with many military merit medals. He was reputed as high qualitied general even expected to promote to Army Chief of Staffs in the future. 8th Army Commander Lt. General Walton Walker was well known as crack field commander who gained fame by thunderbolt adventure to penetrate southern defence line of Germany to capture Lintz of Austria with ghost like speed commanding his 20th Corps under Gen. Patten’s 3rd Army. Unfortunately the two distinguished generals met respective misfortune after doing their duty brilliantly in the Korean War.
General Dean had done his last duty to delay the North invaders at Taejon until July 20 as General Walker requested, that was very critical for earning time in the war. However, he met misfortune of becoming war captive just after Taejon battle. General Walker was killed in traffic accident after the humiliating defeat of Chongchun river defeat by Chinese Army.
In the first stage of the war they never seemed marooned in any frustration psychology that was very important to keep hope for the Korean people as well as US soldiers. They kept conviction that in the result US Army could win the war, though they were anxious to seek new tactics against the invading forces different from the relentless and continuous attacks that the two generals executed in the Second World War as trade mark.
After surveying Chonan frontline, the General Walker’s jeep met one U.S. tank platoon leader from 19th infantry moving forward to support 34th Infantry troops. In this point General Walker already seemed to devise a new tactics to defend and succeed the Korean War. Walker asked the young lieutenant what he was planning to do in the upcoming action. The lieutenant replied that he was going to ‘slug it out’ with the enemy. The General replied a different idea different from his trade mark of relentless and speedy attack tactics to the lieutenant. “Now, our idea is to stop those people. We don’t go up there and charge or slug it out. We take positions where we have the advantage, where we can fire the first shots and still manage a delaying action.”
General Walker presumably calculated a new war plan in which Naktong River defence perimeter should be designed as of the last withdrawal line to reverse the flow of the war, according to General Dean’s recollection. The strength of the North Korean invading forces was so strong and the vertical line from Seoul to Pusan was not so long to allow any wrong offensive strategy. The most important object was not to win the war in a remarkable speed but how to slow down the attacking torrents until UN forces could procure security bridge to fight back the North Korean.
Later, he named the ‘Taegu-Pusan’ perimeter defence operation as ‘Stand or Die’ that connoted no more withdrawal allowed for the defence forces.
Walker Moved 8th Army Hqs to Taegu
General Walker on the same day of July 8 commanded Gen. William Coullier, chief of staff, to prepare establishment 8 army forward headquarters Korea on Taegu, and he himself arrived at the headquarters with a bulk of his staffs on July 13. The headquarters were very strictly guarded with an order that only colonel or general could pass the gate, so even U.S. Ambassador John Muccio had some troubles to meet the general. Mr. Muccio ordered a U.S. flag from Tokyo for his sedan and set it at the front of the car. Whenever he passed the 8th Army headquarters, he boasted of raising 48 stars in his sedan.
Meanwhile, President Rhee stayed at the Kyungbuk governor’s residence in a depressed and frustrating days with whole bad news of the war. He was especially annoyed to hear the news that American solders also were not compatible with the North Korean tank forces in the war front and the front line was coming down toward Taejon rapidly.
President Rhee got the first report of the invasion at the Kyungbok Palace pond on Sunday, June 25 around 10 O’clock where he was throwing fishing angle as old man leisure or a kind of meditation. He was a little shocked with the invasion report for his worrying prophesy turned into reality. Before the War(1948~1950) he repeatedly requested U.S. Government to the effect that if American forces withdrew from the peninsula with the establishment of Republic of Korea, U.S. should have concluded a mutual defence treaty or provide heavy weapons including tanks and anti-tank weapons. If not U.S. forces withdrawal should produce power vacuum in the peninsula that could induce Communists invasion. The North Korean invasion forces advanced with one of the most formidable weapon T34 in the front and trampled down ROK fortresses. The distance from Kaesung near 38th parallel to Seoul was about 60km, and the speed of T34 was 40km/hour, so if they mobilized a blitz krieg such as of Guderian tactics in the Word War 2, Seoul could be overpowered in a day, and probably even President Rhee could not free from the seizing danger.
Without knowing the level of North Korean military danger Seoul cabinet, National Assembly, even Muccio’s U.S. Embassy announced with resolutions or announcements that they would stay and keep Seoul to the last moments. President Rhee boarded south bound special train on 27th early in the morning, when PA(People’s Army) was thrusting his advance tank unit at the Chooksuk Hill of the suburban Seoul. When Rhee recognized his train arrived at Taegu, he strongly commanded going back at least Taejon to manage the war crisis, so the train rolled back to Taejon where he stayed 3 days at the Chungnam Provincial Governor’s residence.
However, with the worsening of the frontline situation, he was urged by U.S. Embassy as well as U.S. military authorities to go down to Pusan, he was driven by car to Iri, to Mokpo, continued sailing to Chinhae to Pusan. In Pusan he soon commanded to move up to Taejon his office and in the course of trip back to Taejon, but his train was stopped by Mr. Cho Jae Chon, Governor of Kyungbuk Province, saying U.S. Embassy sent words not coming up to Taejon for the military cause. So Rhee began his temporary presidential office on Taegu on July 8.
His long evacuation route and consecutive bad news of the front lines gave the old man very hard time, in that sense the news of 8th Army Headquarters moved to Taegu was like a sunshine light in the dark days.
U.S. Embassy First Secretary Dr. Harold Noble wrote that the meeting between Rhee and Walker was successfully arranged with his arrangement. He requested in his daily meeting to General Walker to go and see President Rhee to give bright hope to the President, according to his book ‘Embassy at War’. Or General Walker might have gone to see and thank for the President decision of transferring Korean Military Forces Command and Control Authorities to UN Commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the day of July 14. Anyway, the first meeting between the two very important persons was a real beginning of the Korea-U.S., Korea-UN close coordination and cooperation during the war and afterwards.
Dr. Noble depicted the first face to face meeting of the two characters in his book: “Walker made a tremendous hit with the president at his very first call. It was not that Walker said anything so striking during this brief conversation. It was his character, his obvious sincerity and determination, the impression he gave of sold professional competence, his conviction that we would win, which Rhee gathered from his short exchange of words with Walker.”
When he returned to see the president after Walker had left, he found the president and Mrs. Rhee were really uplifted. Afterwards whenever he found the president looked gloomy and depressed, he took General Walker to see the president, and it always worked.
In the Taegu-Pusan perimeter(Nakdong River Defence Line) defense battle, General Walker deployed very successful deployment to counter the last ditch offence waves of Kim Il Sung forces. From Daboodong alley Korean divisions were deployed shoulder by shoulder to the East Coast horizontally .
ROKA 1st division was located at Daboodong, and to the right ROKA 6th Division at Mungyung-Yechun, and 8th Division at Andong-Yeusung, followed by Capital Division and 3rd Division deployed to the East coast. Meanwhile, along the western side of the Nakdong River U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, 24th, 25th, and lately U.S. 7th Division and U.S. 1st Marine Division deployed vertically. One of the most brilliant management of the defence strategy was the special operation of so called ‘fire brigade’ of 27th Infantry Regiment commanded by Col. John Michaelis(later 4 star general) that had done splendid victory in very critical battle such as Daboodong, Yongchun, and Chindong battle. In the U.S. military history there had not been such a successful mobile unit operation like Machaelis’ fire brigade.
On seeing the Nakdong perimeter lines stabilized with the ‘Stand or Die’ strategy, General MacArthur pulled out U.S. 7th Division and 1st Marine, plus Korean 17th Regiment and ROK Marine to constitute 10th Corps for the historical Inchun landing. After Seoul recovered with Inchun landing, 8th Army headquarters moved to Seoul at the main building of Seoul National University which is quite near to the presidential palace of Dr. Syngman Rhee.
General Walker had kept his close relations with the president as it was in ‘Taegu-Pusan’ period, such as sending general-use lunch box sent from Tokyo to the presidential palace until he suffered very catastrophic defeat in Chongchun River battle. 8th Army encountered Chinese invasion forces to get crushed in rapid advancement by the Oriental guerilla tactics well known as ‘human wave’ tactics.
General Walker led 8th Army crossing over the th 38th parallel on October 7 so hurriedly and unprepared, he encountered quite big troubles with the Chinese intervention that Mao Zhedung Government repeatedly gave warnings to do toward the West through Indian embassy of Peking or direct announcements. 8th Army advanced to the Yalu River border bedridden with at least 3 strategic weak points. The first was short of supply line. The more speedy and further advancement done toward the Korea-Chinse border, land transportation lines became narrower and deep rugged not enough to move supply trucks available. 8th Army could not get necessary battle supplies in absolute quantities.
In October, the North Korean region changed into winter weather already of which night temperature went down deep below zero with heavy snow. U.S. soldiers were not given even winter outfits and equipments that caused big troubles in the ‘totally new war’ of Chinese intervention. Second weak point of the 8th Army came from the command and control seperation of Almond’s 10th Corps. The 10th Corps of the East side over the Charyung mountains was separated from 8th Army command and control, and directly controlled by UNC Commander General MacArthur in Tokyo. No battlefield information or cooperation could be exchanged between the two UNC armies.
And the third weak aspect was not to get accurate information concerning Chinese Army intervention into Korean War.
However, if there were such weak points General Walker suffered that could not rationalize his military fiasco in October and November. His brilliant military merits of Nakdong River defence and even Normandy landing were to become lackluster.
It is known in this circumstance his behaviour became quite impatient. He could not sit in a place calmly, and often snubbed his driver move from one unit to another unit to observe the battle situation with high speed.
Rhee decorated Walker with Gold Taeguk Military Merit
On December 12, when the rumor of second evacuation of Seoul was imminent, Walker called on President Rhee and asked to see war cabinet members together.
In the Cabinet meeting presided by Rhee, Walker asked to President Rhee and his cabinet members why people of Korea would evacuate Seoul and said to them toughly that 8th Army would not evacuate Seoul as long as ROKA could fight, but if Korean people, especially ROK 2nd Corps would not fight against the enemy, there were no way U.S. forces could continue fighting. Rhee answered to the general’s tough remark that ROK soldiers were fighting and they were ready to die for the country.
President Rhee decorated Walker with Gold Taeguk Military Merit, the highest military merit medal on December 19, just 4 days before Walker was killed in traffic accident. The president cordially requested as usual of using Walker’s personal aircraft to go to ROKA front line, and Walker agreed to use it.
On January 3, 1951, General Walker promoted to 4 star general posthumously and layed at Arlington National Cemetery in prestigious funeral service, attending lots of dignitary and laudatory remarks including Korean Special Envoy Dr. Chang Myun, Korean Ambassador to Washington and 3 other Korean specially dispatched diplomats.
General Walker was succeeded by then vice chief of staff Lt. General Matthew Ridgway by whom President Rhee also was often requested to go with him to give battle field admonishing speech to ROK army.
Writer’s E-mail: icolumn@naver.com